

Message Text

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ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ARA-10 EA-10 EUR-12 NEA-10 ISO-00
CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00
NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 OMB-01 TRSE-00
AID-05 EB-08 /121 W
-----080056 181034Z /23

O R 180919Z AUG 77
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 1371

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 3431

LONDON FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE, OSLO FOR AMBASSADOR
MC HENRY

FROM AMBASSADOR MC HENRY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PORG, UN, SF, WA
SUBJECT: NAMIBIA: TALKING POINTS FOR BRIEFING FRONTLINE STATES,
SAG, SYG, ETC.

REF: USUN 2615 (NOTAL)

1. AS REQUESTED REFTEL, FOLLOWING ARE MY COMMENTS ON USUN
DRAFT TALKING POINTS.
2. RE POINTS FOR SAG: IN GENERAL, WE SHOULD INSURE THAT OUR
APPROACH REMAINS THAT OF THE MIDDLEMAN ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT
WITH BOTH PARTIES. WE MUST CONTINUE TO FORCE EACH SIDE TO
CONSIDER SERIOUSLY THE POSITION OF THE OTHER SIDE IN FORMULATING
ITS OWN POSITION. THE SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS AND SOME ASPECTS
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OF THE AGREED ASSESSMENT DEPART SHARPLY FROM OUR PAST
APPROACH. THEY SUGGEST TO THE SAG THAT THE FIVE
THINK THE SWAPO POSITION UNREASONABLE--A SUGGESTION
WHICH, HOWEVER ACCURATE, SAG MAY USE TO OUR DISADVANTAGE
LATER TO JUSTIFY THEIR INTRANSIGENCE. MOREOVER, TALKING POINTS
IMPLY THAT SAG CONCESSIONS WHICH ARE CONSIDERABLY SHORT
OF SWAPO'S DEMANDS MAY PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A SETTLEMENT.

IN FACT, SAG WILL HAVE TO MOVE FURTHER THAN THEIR PRESENT POSITION IF WE ARE TO COMMAND THE NECESSARY SUPPORT FROM FRONT LINE STATES AND OTHERS NEEDED TO PRESSURE SWAPO TO A MORE MIDDLE COURSE. ANY IMPLICATION TO SAG THAT WE CAN REACH AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE MOVEMENT ON THEIR PART MAY ALSO COME BACK TO HAUNT US SINCE IF WE WERE TO FAIL SAG WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO SAY THAT IT MADE THE ADJUSTMENTS WE ASKED AND WE STILL WERE UNABLE TO GET THE OTHER SIDE TO COMPROMISE.

3. THESE GENERAL COMMENTS APPLY PARTICULARLY TO SUGGESTED HANDLING OF WITHDRAWAL AND UN FORCE IN TALKING POINTS AND EARLIER AGREED ASSESSMENT, WHICH NO DOUBT REFLECTS EFFORT OF FIVE TO ACCOMMODATE UKUN (MURRAY) AND POSSIBLY CANADIAN AVERSION TO UN FORCES IN NAMIBIA (OR RHODESIA). TALKING POINTS ALSO REFLECT UKUN ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES ON GROUNDS SOUTH AFRICA WILL DEMAND THEIR CONTINUATION AND ON GROUNDS SOUTH AFRICA CAN REASONABLY EXPECT TO HAVE THE POWER NEEDED TO FULFILL ITS ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES. NEITHER PROPOSAL DEALS WITH THE POLITICAL REALITIES WE FACE IN AFRICA, THE UN, AND, AS I HAVE DISCOVERED, IN NORDIC COUNTRIES.

4. IT IS CLEAR FROM OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH SWAPO, NYERERE, THE OTHER FRONT LINE STATES, UN OFFICIALS, DELEGATES, AND OTHERS, THAT THERE MUST BE A PHASED
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WITHDRAWAL OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES--PERHAPS OVER 8 MONTHS WITH A TOKEN FORCE REMAINING INSTEAD OF COMPLETELY OVER 4-1/2 MONTHS AS SWAPO PROPOSES. IN ADDITION, THERE MUST BE A SUBSTANTIAL UN FORCE. WHETHER SUCH A FORCE IS INTEGRATED WITH THE STAFF OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OR SEPARATE AS SUGGESTED BY SWAPO REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

5. WE CANNOT RESOLVE THIS DIFFERENCE IN APPROACH BETWEEN THE US AND THE UK (AND POSSIBLY CANADA) PRIOR TO INFORMATION SESSION WITH SAG--THOUGH I PROPOSE TO PROBE THE UK POSITION WITH FCO WHEN I RETURN TO LONDON. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOT INADVERTENTLY COMMUNICATE THE UK POSITION. ACCORDINGLY, I PROPOSE THAT TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH SAG BE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS:
(PARA A): WE CAN REDUCE THE SWAPO VS. SOUTH AFRICA TONE BY STRESSING THAT THE POSITIONS TAKEN GO BEYOND SWAPO AND IN SOME RESPECTS ARE SIMILAR TO POSITIONS OF OTHERS WHOSE SUPPORT WE WILL NEED.

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INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 1372

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 STOCKHOLM 3431

LONDON FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE, OSLO FOR AMBASSADOR
MC HENRY

FROM AMBASSADOR MC HENRY

(PARA B): (1) INSERT "NOT" IN SENTENCE, "FIVE OF THESE
DID . . . (2) DELETE THE WORD "GREAT" BEFORE "DIFFICULTY."
(3) END THE LAST SENTENCE AT "TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF
NAMIBIA." MAKE POINT ON WALVIS BAY A SEPARATE POINT
AND ELIMINATE THE SUSPICION, HOWEVER WELL-FOUNDED, THAT
SWAPO REFERENCE TO "TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY" REFERRED TO
WALVIS BAY.
(PARA C): (1) WE SHOULD STATE THE REASONS GIVEN BY SWAPO
TO SUPPORT IS POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL.
(PARA D): (1) LOGICALLY, A CEASEFIRE ALONG WITH THE
APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WOULD NOT PRECEDE
A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION BUT CONSTITUTE STEPS CALLED
FOR IN THE RESOLUTION. THE UN SHOULD HAVE GIVEN SUFFICIENT
ATTENTION TO ADVANCED PLANNING SO THAT NO UNDUE DELAY
OCCURS BETWEEN PASSAGE OF THE RESOLUTION AND THE APPOINTMENT
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AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE AND HIS STAFF.

(2) CHANGE "NOR DID WE JUDGE IT PRUDENT . . ." TO READ

"WE DID NOT DISCUSS . . ."

(PARA E): (1) SENTENCE ON THE DUTIES OF THE UN IS INCOMPLETE. WE ACKNOWLEDGED SWAPO'S CONCERN THAT THE UN COULD ALSO PROVIDE A MEASURE OF CONFIDENCE TO NAMIBIAN PEOPLE. HOWEVER, WE QUESTIONED WHETHER THIS MIGHT NOT ALSO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE CIVILIAN AND MILITARY STAFF OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE. (2) CHANGE "YOU MIGHT LIKE TO CONSIDER . . ." TO READ "ONE WAY TO BRIDGE . . ." (3) CHANGE "AN APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF MILITARY OBSERVERS" TO READ "AN APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL".

(PARA F): (1) PREFACE THE PARA BY RECALLING OUR REQUESTS ON THREE OCCASIONS THAT SA DRAW UP A PLAN FOR PHASED WITHDRAWAL. (2) DELETE "OVER THE WHOLE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE." (3) CHANGE "IT IS NEITHER REALISTIC TO INSIST" TO READ "IT MAY NOT BE REALISTIC TO INSIST." (4) CHANGE "A PROPERLY SUPERVISED AND EFFECTIVE CEASEFIRE. . ." TO READ "A PROPERLY SUPERVISED AND EFFECTIVE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD WHICH INCLUDES A CEASEFIRE WOULD ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF FORCES IN NAMIBIA. . ."

(PARA H): (1) CHANGE "THE FIVE WOULD CONTINUE TO USE 'TO BE SATISFIED WITH'" TO READ "THE FIVE THOUGHT THIS SUBSTANTIVELY CONSISTENT WITH THE TERM 'TO BE SATISFIED WITH.'"

(PARA I): (1) CHANGE "THERE IS NO AGREEMENT AS YET" TO READ "THERE MAY BE NO AGREEMENT".

(PARA J): (1) DELETE EVERYTHING AFTER "VEARING IN MIND". SENTENCE SHOULD READ "BEARING IN MIND THOSE AREAS WHERE DIFFERENCES CONTINUE TO EXIST."

(PARA K): (1) ADD A SENTENCE WHICH STRONGLY NOTES SWAPO AND OUR CONCERN RE ETHNIC MILITARY FORCES AND INSIST THAT THESE CEASE FORTHWITH. (2) INSERT NEW SENTENCE
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BEFORE LAST SENTENCE. "WE WISH TO STATE QUITE STRONGLY THAT THESE ACTIONS SEEMLY REINFORCE THE SUSPICION OF SWAPO AND OTHERS THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT IS NOT INTERESTED IN FAIR ELECTIONS AND CANNOT BE TRUSTED TO ACT IN THE SPIRIT NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE AN AGREED SETTLEMENT."

(PARA L): (1) DELETE "HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS A RELATIVELY MINOR PROBLEM" AND "TO WHICH." SENTENCE WOULD READ, "WE BELIEVE A SOLUTION SHOULD FALL INTO PLACEM . . ."

6. COMMENTS ON TIMIND OBJECTIVES OF BRIEFING
SAG BEING SENT SEPTTEL FROM OSLO.
PERRY

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Message Attributes

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Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
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Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 18-Aug-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Errors: N/A
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Subject: NAMIBIA: TALKING POINTS FOR BRIEFING FRONTLINE STATES, SAG, SYG, ETC.
TAGS: PORG, SF, WA, UN
To: LONDON OSLO
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vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/51f18a58-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
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